process injection Archives

Winsage

May 12, 2025

Microsoft Defender Discovers Zero-Day Vulnerability in Windows CLFS

The deployment of PipeMagic preceded a sophisticated exploit targeting the Common Log File System (CLFS) kernel driver, initiated from a dllhost.exe process. The exploit began with the NtQuerySystemInformation API, which leaked kernel addresses to user mode. In Windows 11, version 24H2, access to specific System Information Classes within this API was restricted to users with SeDebugPrivilege, rendering the exploit ineffective on this version. The exploit then used a memory corruption technique with the RtlSetAllBits API to overwrite its process token with 0xFFFFFFFF, granting it all available privileges and enabling process injection into SYSTEM-level operations. A CLFS BLF file was created at C:ProgramDataSkyPDFPDUDrv.blf, marking the exploit's activity.

Tech Optimizer

April 15, 2025

New ‘Waiting Thread Hijacking’ Malware Technique Evades Modern Security Measures

Security researchers have developed a new malware process injection technique called "Waiting Thread Hijacking" (WTH), which executes harmful code within legitimate processes while avoiding detection by security measures. This method improves upon traditional Thread Execution Hijacking by using a different sequence of operations that bypasses commonly monitored API calls. WTH involves allocating memory and injecting malicious payloads using standard functions, identifying dormant threads within the target process, acquiring thread context with less suspicious permissions, and overwriting the return address on the stack with the injected shellcode. The technique ensures stability by preserving the original state of the thread and allows it to resume normal operations after executing the malicious code. Additionally, WTH employs an obfuscation technique that distributes its steps across multiple child processes to evade behavioral detection systems. While WTH can avoid many conventional detection triggers, it is not completely immune, as some Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions can block unauthorized memory writes. Check Point Research has observed that WTH is effective against certain EDRs while others can block it but not older methods, illustrating the variability in EDR capabilities.